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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-1354 
______________ 
 
RAUL RIVAS RODRIGUEZ,  
a/k/a RAUL RIVAS, 
                   Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent 
______________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals 
(Agency No. A037-640-387) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter A. Durling 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 18, 2016 
______________ 
                                                                
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  December 19, 2016) 
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Fabian Lima, Esq. 
1500 Walnut Street 
Suite 206 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
 Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Juria L. Jones, Esq. 
Holly M. Smith, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
  
 Counsel for Respondent 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
Raul Rivas Rodriguez (“Rivas”) petitions for review of 
the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
dismissing his appeal from an order of the Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) denying his motion to terminate removal proceedings 
and ordering him removed to the Dominican Republic.  
Because the conviction that served as a basis for his removal 
has been vacated, and the Notice of Removal did not specify 
his participation in a deferred adjudication program as a basis 
for removal, we will grant the petition. 
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I 
 
Rivas, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, 
was admitted to the United States as a legal permanent 
resident when he was two years old.  In September 2013, 
following a bench trial in the Philadelphia Municipal Court, 
he was convicted of the purchase, receipt, and intentional 
possession of phencyclidine (“PCP”), and was sentenced to 
eighteen months’ probation.  
 
Following these convictions, the United States 
Department of Homeland Security initiated removal 
proceedings against Rivas and served him with a “Notice to 
Appear.”  A.R. 569-71.  The Notice stated that he was subject 
to removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having 
been convicted of two state law violations relating to a 
controlled substance.   
 
Prior to his immigration hearing and after receiving 
this notice, Rivas petitioned the Municipal Court for relief 
from his convictions under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction 
Relief Act (“PCRA”).  He argued that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise 
him of the possible immigration consequences arising from 
his conviction and for advising him not to appeal the trial 
verdict.  During the three-day PCRA hearing, Rivas’s trial 
counsel testified that he advised Rivas of the immigration 
consequences flowing from a conviction and that he could not 
recall the advice he gave regarding an appeal but “probably 
would have advised [Rivas] that . . . it is still not a winnable 
case. . . .”  A.R. 149.  After the hearings, and at the request of 
the Commonwealth, the Municipal Court denied the PCRA 
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petition and then, by agreement of the parties, vacated the 
guilty verdicts and placed Rivas on pretrial probation for 
three years as part of a deferred adjudication agreement.  
Included in the order vacating the judgment were conditions 
requiring Rivas to: (1) “stipulate to all of the 
Commonwealth’s evidence in the underlying trial”; (2) reside 
in Pennsylvania; (3) report to court, (4) participate, if 
necessary, in employment training as well as drug testing and 
treatment; and (5) “agree that any violation of any of these 
conditions will result in a Negotiated Stipulated Trial.”  A.R. 
120.  The Commonwealth agreed to withdraw the charges if 
Rivas successfully completed his pretrial probation.  
 
Rivas thereafter filed a motion to terminate his 
removal proceedings on the ground that his convictions, 
which constituted the basis for his potential removal, had 
been vacated.  His motion also averred that “[t]he sentences 
have not been vacated solely to avoid the immigration 
consequences of his conviction.”  A.R. 128.  The IJ denied 
Rivas’s motion and ordered him removed to the Dominican 
Republic.  The IJ found that since Rivas’s trial counsel 
testified at the PCRA hearings that he did advise Rivas of the 
immigration consequences of an adverse judgment, and since 
the Municipal Court denied the PCRA petition, the IJ was 
“convinced that the primary and probably the only reason for 
the conviction vacatur was to permit the respondent to avoid 
the [i]mmigration consequences of his drug conviction.”  
App. I 9-10. 
 
 The BIA agreed, finding that the Municipal Court 
vacated Rivas’s convictions to allow him to avoid their 
immigration consequences.  The BIA also found that even if 
Rivas’s convictions had been vacated on substantive grounds, 
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the terms of the order vacating the convictions still amounted 
to a “conviction” under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”).  Specifically, the BIA found that since Rivas 
stipulated to all of the state’s evidence against him as part of 
the agreement vacating his convictions, and since his liberty 
was restrained under the resulting probation program, he 
remained “convicted” under immigration law and was 
removable.  Consequently, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of 
Rivas’s motion to terminate on two independent grounds.  
Rivas petitions for review. 
 
II1 
                                                        
1 The IJ had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(a), 
and the BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3).  Although we generally lack jurisdiction “to 
review any final order of removal against an alien who is 
removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense 
covered in [§ 1227(a)(2)(B)],” we have jurisdiction to review 
an order of removal to the extent it raises “constitutional 
claims or questions of law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D).  
Consequently, we have jurisdiction to determine “whether, as 
a matter of law, the disposition of [Rivas’s] Pennsylvania 
criminal charge constitutes a ‘conviction’ for immigration 
purposes.”  Frias-Camilo v. Att’y Gen., 826 F.3d 699, 702 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).  Since the BIA’s opinion is 
the “final order,” this Court’s review is typically confined to 
the BIA’s opinion.  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 
(3d Cir. 2001).  Where, as here, the BIA expressly adopts the 
IJ’s opinion, this Court also reviews that opinion to the extent 
the BIA adopted it.  Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
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 Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA provides that 
“[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been 
convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a 
State . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . is deportable.”  
The issue here is whether the disposition of Rivas’s state 
court criminal proceedings render him “convicted” for 
purposes of the INA.2   
 
A 
 
 A petitioner whose criminal conviction was vacated is 
no longer “convicted” under the INA where the conviction 
was vacated on the basis of a substantive or procedural defect 
in the underlying criminal proceedings.  In re Pickering, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 621, 624 (BIA 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 465 
F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006).  Conversely, where “a court vacates 
a conviction for reasons unrelated to the merits of the 
underlying criminal proceedings,” such as for rehabilitation 
or to allow a petitioner to avoid the immigration effects of the 
conviction, then the petitioner “remains ‘convicted’ for 
                                                        
 2 The INA defines “conviction” as follows: 
 
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or 
the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilt, and 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of 
punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s 
liberty to be imposed. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 
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immigration purposes.”  Id.; see also Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 
F.3d 240, 242 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that Pickering 
provides a reasonable interpretation of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)); 
Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 208-10 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(same).  A petitioner who seeks relief from removal bears the 
burden of proving that his conviction was vacated.  8 C.F.R. § 
1240.8(d); Syblis v. Att’y Gen., 763 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
 
 Rivas filed a motion for post-conviction relief based 
on alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  After three 
days of hearings, which included testimony from trial 
counsel, the Commonwealth agreed to a settlement pursuant 
to which Rivas’s convictions were vacated.  Although Rivas 
demonstrated that his convictions were vacated, the IJ and 
BIA concluded that Rivas failed to show they were vacated 
within the meaning of the immigration laws.   
 
 To determine whether a vacated conviction is 
nonetheless a conviction for immigration purposes, the IJ 
must examine the state court record to identify the reasons 
why the state court vacated the conviction.  Pinho, 432 F.3d 
at 215.  To complete this task, the IJ “must look first to the 
order [that vacated the conviction].  If the order explains the 
court’s reasons for vacating the conviction, the [IJ]’s inquiry 
must end there.  If the order does not give a clear statement of 
reasons, the [IJ] may look to the record before the court when 
the order was issued.  No other evidence of reasons may be 
considered.”   Id.  Thus, the IJ may rely only on reasons 
explicitly stated in the record and may not impute an 
unexpressed motive for vacating a conviction.  See id.; Cruz, 
452 F.3d at 244, 248 (holding that the BIA could reasonably 
determine that a conviction was vacated to allow a petitioner 
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to avoid immigration consequences where a state prosecutor’s 
letter stipulating the terms of a settlement agreement 
explicitly stated that the petitioner’s scheduled deportation 
was a reason for the state’s support for vacating the 
conviction).  Put simply, “[w]e will not . . . permit[ ] . . . 
speculation . . . about the secret motives of state judges and 
prosecutors.”  Pinho, 432 F.3d at 214-15. 
 
 Here, both the IJ and the BIA opined that the state 
court likely vacated Rivas’s convictions to allow him to avoid 
the convictions’s immigration consequences.  To support this 
conclusion, the IJ relied on the facts that Rivas’s trial counsel 
testified at the PCRA hearings that he did advise his client of 
the immigration consequences of a potential conviction, and 
that the state court denied Rivas’s PCRA petition.  However, 
these facts do not show that the state court vacated the 
convictions to allow Rivas to avoid their immigration 
consequences.  Moreover, though trial counsel’s testimony 
might have weakened Rivas’s ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim, the record fails to show that his counsel’s 
alleged ineffectiveness was not the reason the convictions 
were vacated.  We know only that the application to vacate 
was based on two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 
stemming from the alleged failure of Rivas’ counsel to advise 
him of the immigration consequences of his convictions and 
advice to forgo appealing his convictions, and that the 
convictions were in fact vacated.  See Pinho, 432 F.3d at 211-
13 (holding that where the record shows that the state did not 
answer a pending ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 
before agreeing to settlement, this supports the conclusion 
that the settlement was reached as a result of the 
9 
 
constitutional claim).3  In addition, the IJ did not point to any 
evidence undermining the conclusion that the Commonwealth 
settled because of Rivas’s pending ineffectiveness claim with 
respect to his trial counsel’s failure to advise him to appeal 
the convictions.  In fact, the IJ repeatedly asserted that the 
state court record was not clear as to the reasons why the 
prosecutor agreed to settle Rivas’s claim and why the court 
vacated his convictions.   Moreover, the BIA failed to 
confine itself to the factual record.  Beyond adopting the IJ’s 
findings, it also quoted the following passage wherein the 
state court addressed Rivas and discussed the vacatur of his 
convictions: 
 
[B]ecause you know the consequences of what 
would have happened with the conviction that 
you had . . . .  Everybody understands it, what 
would have happened over a possession 
conviction for PCP.  You have been given an 
incredible opportunity here, and I think it’s the 
right opportunity, and I think it’s the right 
result, but you need to understand it is that 
                                                        
3 Contrary to the Government’s argument, Rumierz v. 
Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2006), does not apply to 
Rivas’s vacatur.  There, because the petitioner’s motion for 
post-conviction relief did not specify any substantive reasons 
to vacate his conviction, the court held that the petitioner 
could not show that his conviction was vacated on substantive 
grounds where it was vacated pursuant to an agreement and 
the record was otherwise silent as to the reason for the 
vacatur.  Id.  In contrast, Rivas’s motion for post-conviction 
relief did specify substantive grounds upon which he 
challenged his convictions, and so Rumierz is inapplicable.   
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opportunity.  And if there [are] temptations, go 
the other way, criminal activity, drug use, 
anything, there’s no margin for error.  If you 
want to be here with your family and you want 
to move forward in your life and do things, then 
you need to understand that. 
 
App. I 5 (alterations, other than the ellipses, in original).  The 
BIA found that these statements showed that the court 
vacated Rivas’s convictions to allow him to avoid the 
resultant immigration consequences.  In reaching this finding, 
however, it speculated as to the unexpressed motives of the 
state court—an analysis which we barred in Pinho.  432 F.3d 
at 215.  It is not plain in the above passage that the 
consequences of convictions to which the court refers are 
immigration consequences, as opposed to penal consequences 
flowing from a conviction.  Moreover, even if the passage 
addresses the immigration consequences of the convictions, it 
does not indicate the reasons why the court vacated the 
convictions and does not show that the court vacated the 
convictions because of those consequences.  Thus, like the IJ, 
the BIA erred in failing to restrict itself to the factual record 
and impermissibly speculated about the “secret motives of 
state judges and prosecutors.”  Pinho, 432 F.3d at 215. 
 
 In sum, Rivas met his burden to show that his 
convictions were vacated for purposes of the immigration 
laws, and the record does not show that Rivas’s convictions 
were vacated to avoid their immigration consequences. 
 
B 
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 The BIA also found that even if Rivas’s convictions 
had been vacated on substantive grounds, he nonetheless 
stood “convicted” for purposes of the immigration laws under 
the terms of the deferred adjudication agreement.  
Specifically, it found that since the state court’s order 
vacating Rivas’s convictions was conditioned on his 
stipulating to all of the state’s evidence against him for the 
underlying convictions, and since the order imposed 
conditions that restricted Rivas’s liberty, he stood “convicted” 
for purposes of the INA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) 
(stating that a petitioner is “convicted” under the INA if he 
has “admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt” 
and “the judge has ordered some form of punishment, 
penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed”).  
We need not decide whether the deferred adjudication 
agreement could render Rivas “convicted” under the INA 
since basing Rivas’s removal on his deferred adjudication 
would violate his due process rights.4 
 
 “It is well established that if an alien is a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States and remains 
                                                        
4 Rivas argues that the DHS waived its right to rely on 
the deferred adjudication as a basis for removal.  Although he 
casts this argument in terms of waiver, the real complaint is 
that he did not receive notice that he might be removed on 
this ground.  Because his brief repeatedly states that the 
Notice to Appear charged him as removable on the basis of 
the Pennsylvania convictions and that by holding him 
removable on the basis of the deferred adjudication 
agreement the BIA “created an entirely new reason for 
upholding the IJ’s decision,” he has in essence asserted that 
his due process rights were violated.  Petitioner Br. at 3. 
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physically present there . . . . [,]  He may not be deprived of 
his life, liberty or property without due process of law.”  
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953).  
Essential to the due process rights of a noncitizen permanent 
resident is that “before his expulsion[,] he is entitled to notice 
of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an 
executive or administrative tribunal.”  Id. at 597; see also 
United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 104 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citing Kwong Hai Chew and reiterating that an alien in 
removal proceedings has a due process right to, among other 
things, “notice of the charges against him”). 
 
 The INA sets forth the notice that must be given to an 
alien before removal proceedings can commence:  
In removal proceedings under section 1229a of 
this title, written notice . . . shall be given in 
person to the alien . . . specifying the following: 
(A) The nature of the proceedings against the 
alien. 
(B) The legal authority under which the 
proceedings are conducted. 
(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in 
violation of law. 
(D) The charges against the alien and the 
statutory provisions alleged to have been 
violated. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1); see Choeum v. I.N.S., 129 F.3d 
29, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the due process 
right to notice owed to a noncitizen permanent resident 
charged with removability is coextensive with the 
notice required by § 1229(a)(1)). 
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 The only Notice to Appear that DHS served 
upon Rivas specified that he was charged with 
removability on the basis of two factual predicates: 
First, “[y]ou were, on September 26, 2013, convicted 
in the Municipal Court at Philadelphia for the offense 
of [i]ntentional possession of a controlled substance by 
person not registered, to wit PCP, in violation of Pa. 
C.S.A Title 35 Section 780-113 subsection A16.”  
A.R. 571.  Second, “[y]ou were, on September 26, 
2013, convicted in the Municipal Court at Philadelphia 
for the offense of [p]urchase/receipt of controlled 
substance by unauthorized person, to wit: PCP, in 
violation of Pa. C.S.A Title 35 Section 780-113 
subsection A19.”  A.R. 571.  The Government never 
lodged additional immigration charges against Rivas.  
See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(e) (“At any time during the 
proceeding, additional or substituted charges of 
inadmissibility and/or deportability and/or factual 
allegations may be lodged by the Service in writing.”).  
As a result, Rivas never received notice charging him 
as removable on the basis of the terms of the 2015 
deferred adjudication agreement, entered almost two 
years after the convictions identified in the Notice to 
Appear.   
 
 Consequently, the BIA’s finding that Rivas’s 
motion to terminate removal proceedings could be 
denied based on the deferred adjudication contravenes 
§ 1229(a)(1)(c)’s requirement that the alien be given 
notice of “[t]he acts or conduct alleged to be in 
violation of law.”  To remove Rivas on the basis of a 
deferred adjudication in 2015 would base his removal 
on an entirely different factual ground from that set 
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forth in the Notice to Appear and would violate 
Rivas’s due process rights to notice of the bases for his 
removal.5 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Rivas’s 
petition for review. 
                                                        
5 If the immigration authorities wish to pursue Rivas’s 
removal based on an assertion that he stands “convicted” of a 
controlled substance offense as a result of the terms of his 
deferred adjudication, then they can initiate removal 
proceedings anew by serving notice to Rivas stating the 
grounds upon which he is charged with removability.  
Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 349 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Although there are common elements of fact between the 
two removal proceedings, the critical acts and the necessary 
documentation were different . . . .  Accordingly, we hold that 
the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the Government from 
lodging additional charges of removability after Duhaney's 
2000 conviction was vacated.”).  Nothing herein constitutes a 
view as to whether such proceedings should be commenced 
or would succeed.  
